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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
No. 10-2248 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA                            
v. 
KEVIN BLACK, 
                            Appellant 
______________ 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE  
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 1-97-cr-00065-001)  
District Judge: Honorable Joseph J. Farnan, Jr. 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 16, 2010 
______________ 
 
Before: SLOVITER, GREENAWAY, JR., and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: January 6, 2011) 
______________ 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge 
 Appellant Kevin Black (“Black”) violated his term of supervised release and was 
sentenced to 24 months of imprisonment.  The District Court for the District of Delaware 
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upwardly departed from the Sentencing Guidelines range for a Class C violation.  Black 
claims that the District Court (1) failed to articulate its reasons for rejecting the 
recommended policy statements, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5), in sentencing him 
above the Sentencing Guidelines range; and (2) abused its discretion in sentencing him to 
a substantively unreasonable period of incarceration.  Black requests that this Court 
reverse and remand the Judgment of conviction.  For the reasons explained below, we 
will affirm the District Court’s Judgment.  
I. BACKGROUND 
We write solely for the parties and recount only the essential facts.   
On December 30, 1997, Black was sentenced on one count of possession of a 
firearm by a felon to a 120-month term of imprisonment and three years of supervised 
release.  At the time of Black’s arrest for the firearm offense, he had an outstanding 
violation of probation warrant for a 1996 conviction for cruelty to animals.  According to 
that violation report, Black had failed to report to 11 office visits before his case was 
returned to the court’s docket.  Black was ordered to serve a subsequent term of 
imprisonment for a state court conviction for second degree conspiracy.  Black also had 
previous juvenile and adult convictions, including a 1994 conviction for carrying a 
concealed deadly weapon and a 1994 conviction for second degree assault. 
Black’s term of supervised release for the 1997 federal conviction started on July 
28, 2009.  Conditions of Black’s supervised release included attending anger 
management group therapy as well as counseling for substance abuse.  On September 19, 
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2009, Black left a therapy group session 15 minutes early without prior approval.  Four 
days later, he failed to appear for a random urine screen.  On September 24, 2009, the 
U.S. Probation office held an administrative hearing detailing Black’s non-compliance 
with counseling.  On October 22, 2009, Black once again left a group therapy session 
early.   
On January 7, 2010, Black was shot, at a McDonald’s restaurant, while riding with 
an “associate,” Windell Hoskins.  When interviewed by Wilmington Police Department 
detectives, Black refused to provide any descriptive information regarding his assailants, 
but claimed that a member of his group therapy sessions was responsible for the shooting.  
Black was charged with possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon in 
connection with the McDonald’s shooting.  The state court issued an arrest warrant.  
Subsequently, these charges were dropped. 
The U.S. Marshals Service took Black into custody on January 26, 2010, after he 
appeared for an office appointment at probation’s office.  Black had $650.00 cash in his 
possession.  Black quickly made bail, but soon after missed a scheduled office meeting 
on February 1, 2010.  Black then absconded from supervision, missing a sufficient 
number of meetings with his probation officer to cause a warrant to be issued on 
February 16, 2010, pursuant to his violation of supervised release.  On April 2, 2010, 
Black was arrested on the warrant.  The District Court held a supervised release 
revocation hearing on April 20, 2010, where Black admitted to not appearing for the 
meetings.   
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 The probation officer’s sentencing memorandum indicated a Sentencing 
Guidelines range of 7 to 13 months based on a Grade C violation and a criminal history 
category of V.  The statutory maximum for the violation was two years, pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).  The probation officer recommended a 12-month term of 
imprisonment to be followed by two years of supervised release with special conditions 
of drug counseling and mental health treatment.     
Defense counsel requested that the Court sentence Black to no jail time, time 
served; or something less than the Sentencing Guidelines range; or seven months at the 
low end of the Sentencing Guidelines range; or one year and a day following the 
probation officer’s recommendation.  Counsel asked that the Court permit Black to move 
out of Delaware to Charlotte, North Carolina to “put him out of harm’s way,” (App. at 
29), and argued that Black’s past activity put him in substantial danger in Delaware.  
Counsel argued that relocation would allow him “out of whatever is going on in 
Delaware that he seems to be a part of . . . but it would also probably secure some safety 
in his life at this point.”  (Id. at 27.)    
The Government recommended incarceration.  (Id. at 33.)  The District Court 
imposed a sentence of 24 months with no term of supervised release to follow. 
 
 
 
 
II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
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The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231 and 
3583(e).  We have jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1).  
Applying an abuse of discretion standard, we review a sentence imposed for violations of 
supervised release for reasonableness.  United States v. Doe, 617 F.3d 766, 769 (3d Cir. 
2010).  “[W]e are to ensure that a substantively reasonable sentence has been imposed in 
a procedurally fair way.”  United States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008). 
To demonstrate that a sentence is procedurally reasonable, a district court must 
show “meaningful consideration of the relevant statutory factors and the exercise of 
independent judgment[.]”  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571-72 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(en banc), cert. denied, 128 U.S. 106 (2007).  The Court should “respond to colorable 
arguments with a factual basis in the record.”  United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 
224 (3d Cir. 2010).  Procedural errors include “failing to calculate (or improperly 
calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to 
consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or 
failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence-including an explanation for any 
deviation from the Guidelines range.”  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)).  A major variance from 
the Sentencing Guidelines requires a more significant justification than a minor one.  
Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. 
We will affirm a procedurally sound sentence as substantively reasonable “unless 
no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular 
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defendant for the reasons the district court provided.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.  We 
focus on the totality of the circumstances, and the party challenging the sentence bears 
the burden of proving the sentence’s unreasonableness.  Id. at 567. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Black argues that the District Court’s sentence of 24 months with no term of 
supervised release was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable.  Regarding 
procedure, Black argues that the District Court failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors 
and articulate its reasons for rejecting the Sentencing Guidelines’ policy statements.   
The sentencing factors enumerated in § 3553(a) for the court to consider include, 
among others:  “(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense; (2) the history and 
characteristics of the defendant; (3) the need to afford adequate deterrence to criminal 
conduct; (4) the need to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (5) 
the need to provide the defendant with appropriate treatment.”  United States v. 
Blackston, 940 F.2d 877, 893 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) and 3583(e)).    
 In this case, the District Court, aware of its statutory obligations, considered, but 
rejected, the Chapter 7 policy statements.  The District Court articulated its reasoning for 
imposing the 24-month term of imprisonment, in full compliance with the 3553(a) 
factors, in part as follows: 
I’m not confident that I or anybody can understand whether 
you’re a part of the problem in Wilmington, or if you’re 
really trying to remove yourself from the problem.  I have 
some indicators, the fact that you had some cash money on 
you.  I understand the explanation, it was from your mom.   
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Somebody decides to shoot you sitting in a McDonald’s.  My 
experience tells me all those kinds of things contend either 
way.  Either you’re in or trying to get back in, or you’re out 
and trying to get further out.   
 
I don’t know whether to protect you from what’s going [sic] 
in our city or to protect the city from you.  It’s a very difficult 
decision.   
 
As I thought about it long and hard, I think the answer for you 
at this time is further incarceration and then no supervised 
release.   
 
If I’m protecting you, I’ll feel good about it.  If I’m protecting 
the community, I’ll feel good about that.  It’s going to be an 
extensive period of incarceration.   
 
I hope you’ll take advantage of any programs that will be 
made available to you.   
 
When you get out, you’ll have no obligation to the 
government. You’ll be able to go to North Carolina and do 
what you want to do . . . 
 
. . . . 
 
 I don’t think you’re a risk while incarcerated. . . 
 
 . . . . 
 
In order to do what I am doing, I have to reject the 
recommended policy statements.  I’m stating that on the 
record.   
 
I understand the policy statements, and that pursuant [sic] 
pursuant to Title 18, Section 3553(a)(5), I’m going to 
sentence you on this violation to 24 months of incarceration. 
 
(App. at 34-35.) 
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Based on the record, we find that the District Court sufficiently articulated its 
reasons for imposing the sentence consistent with § 3553(a).  The Court considered the 
nature and circumstances of the violation, the history and characteristics of the defendant, 
appropriate treatment for the defendant, and his danger to the community.  After 
“th[inking] about it long and hard,” (id. at 34), the Court decided that a longer term of 
imprisonment with no supervised release was warranted, in part, due to Black’s history of 
failing to adhere to the mandates of supervised release.  Following sentence, Black would 
have no obligation to the government.  The District Court’s discussion of these factors 
reflects its basis and reasoning for rejecting the policy statements.  United States v. 
Kononchuk, 485 F.3d 199, 204 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he district court need not discuss and 
make findings as to each of the § 3553(a) factors if the record makes clear that the court 
took the factors into account in sentencing[.]”).  
We also find the District Court’s sentence to be substantively reasonable.  Prior to 
absconding from supervision, Black failed to comply with the special conditions of his 
supervised release of mental health counseling and random urine/drug screening.  Six 
months into his three-year term of supervised release, Black absconded from supervision.  
Black’s probation officer was unable to make contact with him from February 1, 2010 
through April 2, 2010, and Black did not surrender on the District Court’s arrest warrant, 
after his relatives had been contacted by law enforcement.   
Additionally, the District Court emphasized its concern for protecting the 
community.  The Court concluded that the circumstances of Black’s violation and his 
9 
 
extensive criminal record as well as his prior failures to comply with terms of supervised 
release and probation were sufficient cause for upwardly departing and fashioning an 
appropriate individualized sentence.  The Court’s careful consideration is not diluted by 
its discussion of “protecting” the defendant, which Black claims was an improper and 
unreasonable consideration.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 We find that the District Court did not abuse its discretion.  We will affirm the 
District Court’s Judgment.    
